UNESCO's effort to include many different types of human expression on its lists is commendable and an important attempt to safeguard aspects of the world's cultural heritage.
Introduction
This paper is inspired by the 2003 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 3 tangible are indissolubly linked and a preferred definition might be developed around the idea of "living cultural heritage."
The label of intangible is particularly problematic when considering dance as heritage, given the central role that the human body has in the practice of dance, and because the phenomenon of dance is simultaneously emergent from, and constitutive of culture and society. Buckland (2001, 1) confirms the increased social science interest in the body and performance has 'helped to raise the profile of dance as a significant academic site for cultural investigation'. This development has opened up channels for dialogue with other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. In recent years, embodiment has been explored sociologically through dance in a range of ways including: cultural theory and everyday life (Thomas 2003 (Thomas , 2013 bodylore and bodily knowledge (Sklar, 1994 (Sklar, , 2001 , bodywork (BraceGovan, 2002) , embodied identity (Dyck & Archetti, 2003) and ageing, injury and identity (Wainwright & Turner, 2006) . There are some notable early exceptions, Novak (1988) for example, incorporated dance as a key exemplar in her work on culture. One reason for this, Buckland argues, drawing on Connerton's (1989) distinction between incorporated and inscribed practices, is that dance 'has a particular propensity to foreground cultural memory as embodied practice by virtue of its predominantly somatic modes of transmission', thus making dance strongly relevant to discussions of cultural heritage through the incorporation of specific cultural elements (such as artefacts and movement vocabularies) into its practice.
Dance is also an inscribed practice as Blacking (1983, 97) illustrates, 'the bodily experience of performance can also stimulate the imagination and help to bring new coherence to the sensuous life, which in turn could affect motivation, commitment and decision-making in other spheres of social life.' Therefore, while culture is incorporated within dance, such dances are also inscribed with layers of shared meanings (which may be symbolic, narrative, 4 emotional, aesthetic depending on the genre) making it not only a site of cultural reception but also a site of cultural production out of which a range of material or tangible phenomena emerge.
In what follows, first we provide a critical consideration of the UNESCO definitions of cultural heritage and of intangible cultural heritage. Next, we introduce the idea of living cultural heritage illustrated through dance and supported by selected elements of three "postdualist" social theories: Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, Bourdieu's theory of practice, and Giddens' Structuration theory. We focus specifically on the aspects of these theories that attempt to replace binary oppositions between agency/structure, body/mind and cultural fields/dispositions respectively with post-dualist explanations and suggest how these provide the conceptual underpinnings for the idea of living cultural heritage. We conclude by outlining the model of living heritage that uses the above post-dualist ideas as a stepping stone towards a more inclusive and fluid model of cultural heritage in dance. In this model, the cultural, embodied, practical, spatial, temporal and artefactual elements of cultural heritage are retained as each contributes to an emergent process of exchange and dialogue resulting in cultural heritage that is simultaneously tangible and intangible.
UNESCO's definitions of cultural heritage and the problem of the tangible/intangible binary

UNESCO and other international organisations, such as the International Council on
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) have, over the years, issued various recommendations, charters and resolutions on the topic of heritage, some of which include definitions (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004; Ahmad, 2006) . However, for the scope of this article, we have focused on the two main UNESCO conventions (which define rules to which member states have to comply as law [UNESCO n.d.] ) on cultural heritage. These two UNESCO conventions give definitions of cultural heritage, which represent a big shift in perspective and summarise years of negotiations. The first of these conventions took place in 1972 and the second in 2003. These two definitions reflect a change in attitudes and agendas towards cultural heritage for UNESCO and will provide the starting point for our analysis. Article 1 of the 1972 UNESCO convention states:
For the purpose of this Convention, the following shall be considered as "cultural heritage": monuments ... groups of buildings ... of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; sites ... of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view. (UNESCO 1972, 2) According to Munjeri (2004, 13) 'What qualified as cultural heritage was deemed to be stable, and static and having "intrinsic values".' However, as Isar (2011, 45) points out, 'The World Heritage List would inevitably be skewed towards those countries richly endowed with buildings (mainly monumental) and places that satisfied criteria elaborated by experts whose value judgments reflected their own cultural moorings'. This resulted in Europe being overrepresented, at the expense of countries that had fewer monumental buildings. According to Isar (47) , it was the election of a Japanese diplomat, Koïchiro Matsuura, to the role of UNESCO Director-General in 1999 (Japan being a country in which there was already strong awareness of "intangible" heritage), together with the emergence of the 'combat for cultural diversity' in international cultural politics, that led to the 2003 UNESCO convention on intangible cultural heritage. However, Schmitt (2008) mean 'incapable of being perceived by touch; impalpable' but also 'imprecise or unclear to the mind'. According to the Oxford Dictionary online (Oxford, n.d.), intangible means 'unable to be touched; not having physical presence' but also 'difficult or impossible to define or understand; vague and abstract'. In this paper we have adopted the first meaning of the word intangible, the most literal one of something that cannot be touched. However, 'practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills' involve the human body to one degree or another (especially so in the case of dance) and are neither completely immaterial, nor vague, because, as the UNESCO definition itself states, they provide communities and individuals with a sense of identity and way of life. Moreover, the expression intangible cultural heritage creates a dichotomy between tangible and intangible domains, which is analogous to the mind-body Cartesian dichotomy for the way in which it separates the immaterial and material. Therefore, we consider, it is better to replace the dualism (two divided and distinct entities) of tangible vs intangible with the post-dualist idea of duality (a unity of two divergent aspects of the same reality), as a first step towards a model of heritage in which material and immaterial entities interact. The idea of duality is inspired by Giddens' (1984) Structuration theory, which explicitly presents social structure and individual agency as a duality. A number of experts in the field of heritage have already highlighted the fact that distinguishing clearly between tangible and intangible elements in heritage is not possible.
For example, as Howard points out (2003, 6) , 'things actually inherited do not become heritage until they are recognized as such.' Hence, even tangible objects have value as heritage because of this intangible quality they are invested with. Similarly, Smith and Akagawa (2008, 6 ) 'question the ... utility of polarising debate between "tangible" and "intangible" heritage. Heritage only becomes "heritage" when it becomes recognisable within a particular set of cultural or social values, which are themselves "intangible".' Smith (2006, 3) goes further, arguing that the in/tangible binary sustains an 'authorized heritage discourse' which privileges objects over people and practices, commenting, 'all heritage is intangible. In stressing the intangibility of heritage, however, I
am not dismissing the tangible or pre-discursive, but simply deprivileging and denaturalizing it as the self-evident form and essence of heritage.' (4). Conversely, Skounti (2008, 77) contends 'pure immateriality is a fiction: can something intangible exist?' He focuses on the embodied dimension of heritage, identifying a spectrum that goes from the most intangible to tangible elements:
There is obviously a material dimension to every element of intangible heritage: the human brain and body that detain it, the book that retains a trace of it, the audiovisual material that captures its sound or image. Without this material dimension this element could not be shared, would not exist.
More recently, Naguib (2013) argued that tangible and intangible aspects of heritage are tightly interwoven. For Naguib (2008, 278) : 'The tangible is transfused into the intangible, and concrete objects evoke historical events, ways of life, social structures and practices, religious systems and beliefs.' In this sense, Isar (2011, 49) considers:
All monuments, sites and artefacts embody intangible components such as spiritual values, symbols, and meanings, together with the knowledge and the know-how of craftsmanship and construction. Without these intangibles they would not have been made in the first place, nor would they have become 'heritage' today.
UNESCO itself introduces tangible elements in its intangible heritage definition: 'The "intangible cultural heritage" means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills -as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith.' However, Howard (2010, 4) struggles with the idea of intangible cultural heritage, so much so that he prefers 'the concept of activities, as food and drink, for example, are quite tangible, though not easy to conserve, and in this case it is the continuance of the activity that is sought.' Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2004) , like Naguib, is also wary of neat separations between tangibility and intangibility. She points out that there is increasing awareness of the 'arbitrariness' of the distinction between UNESCO's natural, tangible and intangible lists, as these do not reflect the 'real world' overlap between the tangible, intangible and natural elements of heritage. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2004, 53) Kirshenblatt-Gimblett introduces three key ideas that lend credence to re-framing the paradigm of intangible cultural heritage around the concept of living cultural heritage; namely traditions, the concept of heritage being alive and the term habitus. Each of these ideas will be developed further in this paper and linked with the social concepts being addressed.
For us, the link to address the dualism of tangible versus intangible rests with making connections between the post-dualistic social science literature, which presents powerful critiques of Cartesianism and offers alternative stances on human mind-body-societyenvironment-artefact relationships. More specifically, Merleau-Ponty's ( [1945] 1992) phenomenology and concept of habit fuses the ideas of perceptions, emotions and mind/body unity, a stance now supported by recent discoveries in neuroscience (Damasio, 2012 ); Bourdieu's (1977) theory of practice and notion of habitus integrates cultural environment influences and embodied individuals. Lastly, Giddens' (1984) Structuration theory collapses distinctions between structure/agency. Each of these are important as they place people at the heart of society, its processes and structures which resonates with Kirshenblatt-Gimblett's (2004) The alternative model and definition of living heritage, which we propose, seeks to collapse the tangible/intangible dualism and to integrate embodied human beings with heritage.
In/tangible cultural heritage can be defined thus: "Living cultural heritage" is embodied by individuals, in connections with the artefacts they produce and use and the environment they interact with and it is expressed through practices, activities and performances. Living cultural 12 Figure 2 illustrates the starting point; the tangible and intangible elements not only overlap as they are currently expressed in practices, experiences and activities, but rather are infused with one another so that intangible and tangible elements combine and emerge as living cultural heritage through practices, experiences, activities, artefacts, emotions and environment. The arrows in the figure represent the idea of movement and reflexivity, the circular relationship between tangible and intangible elements as they interact. Similarly, the dotted lines represent movement and the vertical one is a fulcrum around which tangible and intangible move. In order to substantiate this, we now turn to the respective "post-dualist" perspectives offered in the theories of Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu and Giddens respectively, which will be drawn on with the activity of dance used alongside these discussions to show how these concepts apply to dance.
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology: mind-(perceptual habit)-body holism
Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1992, 102) provides the first in/tangible perspective: that of a holistic 13 view of mind and body with the bridge being habit. He postulates, 'the union of soul and body is not an amalgamation between two mutually external terms, subject and object, brought about by arbitrary decree. It is enacted at every instant in the movement of existence'.
According to Merleau-Ponty ([1945 , when we learn, we do so through our bodies, developing bodily habits, which are inscribed in culture and which change as we learn new skills, 'It is the body which "catches"(kapiert) and "comprehends" the movement. The acquisition of habit is indeed the grasping of a significance, but it is the motor grasping of a motor significance.' Kearney has already pointed out how Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology:
Renders distinctions of tangible and intangible almost redundant as the only imperative status of tangible is held by the human actor and agent, as physical embodiment of culture and heritage. Through this 'being', human heritage is always and at once tangible and intangible…Most commonly deemed as that which cannot be seen or perceived through the senses, intangible cultural elements are often defined through their incorporeality. In phenomenological terms, this separation cannot exist. As such, any discussion of intangibility implicates tangibility (of the body). (2008, 211) Figure 3 illustrates how the tangible/intangible dualism becomes a holistic entity from a Merleau-Pontian phenomenological point of view. For phenomenology, perception is central, so perception is the overarching post-dualist element in this model. The mind corresponds to the intangible elements, the body to the tangible elements. As body and mind are a unity, they are constituted of a holistic amalgam of tangible and intangible elements of being. Perceptual habit is the way in which the body learns from and negotiates with the world around it. As Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1992) argued, skills are learnt in an embodied way, by enlargement of body schemata. A body schema is, as Bullington (2013) The significance of the phenomenological holism is that it shows how dance heritage and the emotions are deeply, inseparably connected. A specific example can be found in Egyptian dance. When a dancer performs to folkloric music, according to Bordelon:
Arabic customers see movement they know and understand, recognize it as part of their cultural heritage, and echo that movement in their own bodies ... Some people get up and dance on stage, there is ... a physical empathy in the room. (2013, 39) When dancing to traditional Egyptian songs, the dancer has the power to communicate to the audience the feelings that she perceives in the music and to create a shared sense of tarab, which in Arabic means ecstasy, transcendence, enchantment. As Bordelon continues:
The dancer evokes feelings and emotions from the music and lyrics and invokes images and memories from the past. The feelings produced by those memories, are, in turn, transferred to the current performance environment inching the dancer, the musicians, and the audience, towards a state of tarab. (2013, 42) Through tarab, therefore, the dancer creates a connection with the audience who identify with her in that moment. The dancer becomes the embodiment of the music, the feelings and the memory evoked by the song, in such a way that 'the audience members can identify with the dancer and thereby access the music in an entirely unique, physical fashion.' (Bordelon continues 2013, 45) . Connecting to the concept of mirror neurons can help explain where the neurological basis for this lies. Modern neuroscience supports the idea that body and mind are a unity; according to Damasio (2012, 21) 'body and brain bond'. Moreover, the concept of mirror neurons can help explain the intercorporeal phenomena of kinaesthetic empathy (which is involved in the state of tarab) in neuroscientists terms. As Damasio explains (103):
'So-called mirror neurons are, in effect, the ultimate as-if body device ... the simulation, in the brain's body maps, of a body state that is not actually taking place in the organism.' Another study by Barsalou et alia (2003, 44) highlights how the body can re-enact memories:
When an event is experienced originally, the underlying sensory, motor and introspective states are partially stored. Later, when knowledge of the event becomes relevant in memory, language or thought, these original states are partially simulated.
Depending on the situation, according to the authors, embodiment may range from simulation, to traces of execution, to full-blown execution. To further highlight the connection between body and emotions, a study by Sedlmeier, Weigelt and Walther (2011, 303) investigates how body movement can influence taste in music:
When ... music is listened to in situations in which "positive" body movements and muscle inner actions are frequent, this positive affect could become strongly associated with the music ... dancing might increase the liking for the music one is dancing to. Kearney (2008) is surely right in her argument that embodied and emotional impact is very important in overcoming current dualistic heritage discourse. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty and modern neuroscience support the unity of body and mind, which, for dance heritage, means that we might better focus on how dance heritage emerges holistically between embodied individuals and their emotions, via a set of codified movements learnt with the body but also deeply embedded in their minds. However, while the mind-(habit)-body holism in phenomenology is central to better understanding dance heritage, an important gap remains: the specific social and cultural environments in which heritage is experienced and practiced.
For this we turn to Bourdieu's theory of practice.
It is worth noting that Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty come from completely different disciplinary positions: phenomenology for Merleau-Ponty and a philosophical/sociological/anthropological background for Bourdieu. In spite of the inherent differences in these positions, Bourdieu's and Merleau-Ponty's ideas have been used together elsewhere to highlight the importance of a multiple perspective on the body. In proposing a paradigm for embodiment, Csordas (1990 Csordas ( , 1993 brings together Bourdieu's issue of practice and Merleau-Ponty's concept of perception. Csordas (1993: 137) clarifies that:
Merleau-Ponty ... recognized that perception was always embedded in a cultural world ... at the same time, he acknowledged that his own work did not elaborate the steps between perception and explicit cultural and historical analysis ... precisely at this point where Merleau-Ponty left off, it is valuable to reintroduce Bourdieu's emphasis on the socially informed body as the ground of collective life. Bourdieu's (1990:25) work sought to overcome the pervasive opposition between subjectivism and objectivism in social sciences, on which he commented, 'of all the oppositions that artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most ruinous, is the one that is set up between subjectivism and objectivism in sociological terms.' In order to overcome such dualism, Bourdieu developed a reflexive sociological account focusing on the modality of cultural practice:
Bourdieu's theory of practice: Field-(practice)-habitus as reflexivity
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (for example, the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices. (Bourdieu,1977, 72) Therefore, the sociocultural environment via practice produces habitus which can also be read as a fusion of the in/tangible being part physical, part perceptual, because it consists of certain practical bodily dispositions, which are learnt by watching (perception), judging (appreciation) and doing (action):
Produced by practice of successive generations, in conditions of existence of a determinate type, these schemes of perception, appreciation, and action, which are acquired through practice and applied in their practical state without acceding to explicit representation, function as practical operators through which the objective structures of which they are a product tend to reproduce themselves in practice. (Bourdieu, 1977: 97) The significance of the reflexive habitus-(practice)-field perspective, therefore, in the field of heritage is doubly important. Firstly, habitus is rooted in history; Bourdieu (1990, 56) states 19 that habitus is 'embodied history, internalized as a second nature ... the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product.' Therefore, habitus helps to think beyond the dualism of tangible bodies vs intangible rules and traditions, as habitus is physical, but also partly intangible being the location for the expression of social structures and the legitimate, valued practices and tastes they contain. The historic dimension of the field-(practice)-habitus interrelationship is also important for a second reason, because it explains how cultural dance heritage is transmitted from the field to the habitus of the dancer (and viewer) through field specific practices. Taste, according to Bourdieu, is influenced by the class to which individuals belong and is (Bourdieu 1986, 174) Only with that viewer's careful investigation of the minutiae do they disclose their treasure.' Therefore, in building a conception of living cultural heritage, Bourdieu's use of reflexivity is extremely important as it helps us to see how:
Social agents are the product ... of the history of the whole social field and of the accumulated experience of a path within the specific subfield...social agents will actively determine, on the basis of these socially and historically constituted categories of perception and appreciation, the situation that determines them. (Bourdieu, 1992: 136) Bourdieu's reflexive perspective of field-(practice)-habitus helps highlight how the dancing body takes in and (normatively) reproduces, in movement, some of the core values of a cultural field and society and, in so doing, bridges the in/tangible divide. Moreover, this view of cultural context helps to re-appraise Merleau-Ponty's concept of habit as also dynamic and reflexive, because new actions create new habits, as we learn by changing our 'body schemata'. This helps us to assert how living cultural heritage in dance is not only acquired through practice and habit, but also changeable according to changing cultural contexts and practices and a dancer's relationship to them. For further insight into this latter point we turn, finally, to Giddens' idea of structure/agency duality . Giddens (1984) developed Structuration theory in order to modify the dualism of agency and structure and, in particular, address the 'problem of agency' that according to him had existed up until that point in sociology. His solution was to propose structure (and agency) as a duality, arguing that, 'By the duality of structure I mean that the structural properties of social 22 systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems' (Giddens, 1976, 69) , suggesting that agency and structure are much more than coexisting but dual entities, but they inherently depended on each other, with the 'bridge' being the engagement with rules and resources. Giddens (1984, 171) postulates: 'Human societies, or social systems, would plainly not exist without any agency. But it is not the case that actors create social systems: they reproduce or transform them, remaking what is already made in the continuity of praxis'. In evolving the process of structuration as an explanation of continuity and change, he argues that structures are simultaneously external and internal to individuals. Moreover:
Giddens' Structuration theory: structure-(rules/resources)-agency as duality
Structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling. This, of course, does not prevent the structured properties of social systems from stretching away, in time and space, beyond the control of any individual actors. (Giddens 1984, 25) There is, therefore, a dialectic relationship between individuals and structures, as individuals simultaneously draw on, challenge and reproduce structures through their own actions. The way in which individuals act on structures can be conscious, unconscious or in a third way that Giddens identifies: through practical consciousness which, 'consists of all the things which actors know tacitly about how to "go on" in the contexts of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression ' (1984, XXII) . Daily repetition of the same actions, according to Giddens, gives individuals ontological security, a feeling of stability and continuity.
At the heart of Giddens' duality of structure and agency is also a perspective that helps us move beyond the in/tangible dualism in developing the idea of living cultural heritage. Giddens argues, structures comprise sets of rules and resources, which are simultaneously tangible and intangible. Individuals draw on rules and resources (structures) to 23 act and, depending on their knowledge of certain rules and access to certain resources, may find these enabling or constraining. The in/tangible duality lies in Giddens' articulation of how individuals draw on what he refers to as allocative resources or 'forms of transformative capacity ' (1984, 33) to facilitate social action in ways which sustain and transform traditions.
This relates to artefacts (and space, as discussed earlier) which are present in UNESCO's intangible heritage definition as 'instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces ' (2003, 2) .
Artefacts are connected to the society and culture that creates them and the bodies that manipulate them and therefore can reasonably be considered as tangible resources or 'structural properties of social systems' which are 'both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize' (Giddens, 1984, 25) . Burkitt (1999, 36) further articulates the transformative capacity of artefacts:
The term artefact refers to a created object in which human acting is embodied because it has been fashioned for some use within human practices ... certain forms of bodily carriage and movement appear, or ways of handling objects and manipulating them, which are culture specific. Thus, our way of 'being in the world', of acting, knowing and thinking, is largely dependant on artefacts and how they re-form embodiment.
This point about artefacts echoes Merleau-Ponty ([1945 , as 'habit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments'. Hence, artefacts can become extensions of a person's body when they learn how to use them through habit.
Following Burkitt and Merleau-Ponty, the skills and artefacts mentioned in the UNESCO definition are allocative resources connected to each other and are also, in turn, embodied in the individuals that form part of the fields which produce those skills and artefacts. Skills are intangible and connect with Giddens' rules in terms of how best to use these artefacts. Figure   5 represents the core duality of Giddens' agency and structure relationship and how they relate to the in/tangible duality as presented in the process of structuration. Social systems are constantly reformed by the interplay of individuals and structures; the intangible elements are structures (that generate rules, resources and opportunities for/constraints on social action); individuals are the tangible elements, as they have bodies that allow them to interact with structures through actions (praxis). In any pursuit of protecting and/or documenting dance as heritage, the model of 'living heritage' helps to identify the many in/tangible pieces that make up the 'puzzle' of dance. For example, in documenting dance as heritage according to this model, it is insufficient to limit ourselves to transmitting the movements, or to writing notations or filming the dance. On the other hand, it is not enough to just document the context of the dance, whilst ignoring the movements. In order to document a complex phenomenon such as dance, we need to document movements, feelings (by recording interviews given or refer to texts written by the people involved), cultural context, artefacts and everything that helps assemble this complex cultural puzzle. This is a process that has already been started by dance scholars such as Novack (1988) , who analysed dances from the physical as well as cultural point of view. The framework of living heritage expands Novack's view on dance and connects it with the heritage discourse, in order to facilitate dance's broadest possible transmission and documentation. Finally, connecting dance with the broader heritage discourses through the model of living heritage, will allow dance to be elevated in value as a vital part of human world heritage, but on its own terms, without being forced into preexisting heritage models, none of which make justice to dance in its entirety.
This model is not intended as a construction particular to dance, but it can be adapted to other specific forms of heritage (such as traditional martial arts and other ritualised physical activities). To varying degrees, all heritage contains both tangible and intangible elements which are social, cultural, physical, material and emotional, all of which cannot be disconnected from each other. Differences in the type of heritage would, of course, need to be taken into account, particularly the fact that the body can be more or less central in other types of heritage (being very central in dance and other expressions of physical culture but less so, although still present, in monumental heritage, for example).
Hence, we consider that the perspective of living cultural heritage for dance developed in this paper, offers a principled conceptual starting point to facilitate further critical scrutiny of how specific forms of living physical cultural heritage come into being, are passed on and, therefore, how they might best be protected. Finally, an important aspect this perspective of cultural heritage can illuminate, which is beyond the space of this essay, is the increasingly rapid transmission and transformation of dance as living cultural heritage as it takes place across social and cultural time and space, un-restricted by geographical boundaries. This will be the subject of future enquiry.
